The Last Good Neighbor

MEXICO IN THE GLOBAL SIXTIES

Eric Zolov

The Last Good Neighbor

American Encounters/
Global Interactions
a series edited by Gilbert M. Joseph
and Penny Von Eschen

The series aims to stimulate critical perspectives and fresh interpretive frameworks for scholarship on the history of the imposing global presence of the United States. Its primary concerns include the deployment and contestation of power, the construction and deconstruction of cultural and political borders, the fluid meaning of intercultural encounters, and the complex interplay between the global and the local. American Encounters seeks to strengthen dialogue and collaboration between historians of US international relations and area studies specialists.

The series encourages scholarship based on multi-archive historical research. At the same time, it supports a recognition of the representational character of all stories about the past and promotes critical inquiry into issues of subjectivity and narrative. In the process, American Encounters strives to understand the context in which meanings related to nations, cultures, and political economy are continually produced, challenged, and reshaped.

The Last Good Neighbor

MEXICO IN THE GLOBAL SIXTIES

Eric Zolov

Duke University Press Durham and London 2020

Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper ∞
Designed by Aimee C. Harrison
Typeset in SangBleu Empire, SangBleu Republic,
and SangBleu Sunrise by Westchester Publishing Services

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Zolov, Eric, author.
Title: The last good neighbor : Mexico in the global sixties / Eric Zolov.
Other titles: Mexico in the global sixties
Description: Durham : Duke University Press, 2020. | Series: American encounters/global interactions | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2019033255 (print) | LCCN 2019033256 (ebook)
ISBN 9781478005438 (hardcover)
ISBN 9781478006206 (paperback)
ISBN 9781478007104 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Mexico—Foreign relations—1946–1970. | Cold War. | Mexico—Foreign relations—United States. | United States—Foreign relations—Mexico. | Mexico—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. | Soviet Union—Foreign relations—Mexico.
Classification: LCC F1235 .Z64 2020 (print) | LCC F1235 (ebook) | DDC 327.72009/046—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019033255
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019033256

Cover art: Photograph of LBJ's spring 1966 trip of Mexico City. Courtesy of White House Photo Office Collection, LBJ Presidential Library.

To the G-Z Clan,
Hailey, Domino, and Beardy included

Contents

List of Abbreviations

AAPSO	Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization
ABP	Avery Brundage Papers
AGN	Archivo General de la Nación (General National Archives)
ALM	Adolfo López Mateos
AP	Associated Press
ARA	Agency for Research Analysis
Bancomext	Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior (National Bank for External Trade)
CANACINTRA	Cámara Nacional de la Industria de Transformación (National Chamber of Transformation Industries)
CCI	Central Campesina Independiente (Independent Campesino Center)
CEM	Círculo de Estudios Mexicanos (Circle of Mexican Studies)
CFP	Carlos Fuentes Papers
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMP	Comité Mexicano por la Paz (Mexican Peace Committee)
CNC	Confederación Nacional Campesina (National Campesino Confederation)
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Soviet Union
CONASUPO	Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (National Corporation for Popular Subsistence)
CONCAMIN	Confederación de Cámaras Industriales (Industrial Chambers Confederation)
CTAL	Confederación de los Trabajadores de América Latina (Confederation of Latin American Workers)

CTM	Confederación de Trabajadores de México (Confederation of Mexican Workers)
DFS	Dirección Federal de Seguridad (Federal Security Directorate)
DIPS (DGIPS)	Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (General Directorate of Social and Political Investigations)
ECLA	Economic Commission for Latin America
EEC	European Economic Community
FAR	Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (Rebel Armed Forces, Guatemala)
FEP	Frente Electoral del Pueblo (People's Electoral Front)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FLN	Frente de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Front, Venezuela)
FRAP	Frente de Acción Popular (Popular Action Front, Chile)
FIDEL	Frente Izquierda de Liberación (Leftwing Liberation Front, Uruguay)
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GPRA	Gouvernement Provisionel de la République Algérienne (Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic)
G-77	Group of 77
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INAH	Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia (National Institute of Anthropology and History)
INBA	Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes (National Fine Arts Institute)
IOC	International Olympic Committee
IRD	Information Research Department
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialization
JFKL	John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, Soviet Union)
LAFTA	Latin American Free Trade Agreement
LBJ Library	Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library
MAR	Movimiento de Acción Revolucionario (Revolutionary Action Movement)
MLN	Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (Movement of National Liberation)
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIEO	New International Economic Order

OAS	Organization of American States
OCIAA	Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
OLAS	Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad (Organization of Latin American Solidarity)
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSPAAAL	Organization in Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America
PAN	Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party)
PCM	Partido Comunista Mexicano (Communist Party of Mexico)
PIPSA	Productora e Importadora de Papel, Sociedad Anónima (Corporation for the Production and Importâtion of Paper)
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
POCM	Partido Obrero Campesino Mexicano (Mexican Worker-Peasant Party)
PP	Partido Popular (Popular Party)
PPS	Partido Popular Socialista (Popular Socialist Party, Mexico)
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRI	Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party)
PSP	Partido Socialista Popular (Popular Socialist Party, Cuba)
RG	Record Group
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
SRE	Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
STFRM	Sindicato de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros de la República Mexicana (Union of Railroad Workers of the Mexican Republic)
TASS	Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskovo Soyuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)
TGP	Taller de Gráfica Popular (Popular Graphic Workshop)
TNA	The National Archives (Great Britain)
UAR	United Arab Republic (Egypt)
UGOCM	Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos Mexicanos (General Union of Mexican Workers and Campesinos)
UN	United Nations
UNAM	Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (National Autonomous University of Mexico)
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Economic Development
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UPI	United Press International
USIA	US Information Agency
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)
UOM	Universidad Obrera de México (Workers' University of Mexico)
WPC	World Peace Council

Acknowledgments

There is surely no greater pleasure when finishing a book than sitting down to write the acknowledgments. Not only does this act signal the end of a long project, but it offers the chance to give appreciation to the numerous friends, family, colleagues, and public servants who have enabled one to get to this point of closure. And while the disadvantage of a project such as this one is that it went on far longer than anticipated, the upside is that it has given me the opportunity to meet many new colleagues working on interrelated topics. The process of sharing with and learning from others whose interests overlap with my own has been among the most gratifying aspects of this otherwise very long haul.

The research origins of this book date to a yearlong sabbatical in 2001–2 supported by grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities and Fulbright García-Robles. This support allowed me to spend many months poring through archives in the United States and Mexico at a moment when the downfall of the ruling party (PRI) led to unprecedented access to secret police documents that were formerly off limits. It was an exciting moment to be in Mexico's Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), and I am forever appreciative of the support and insights shared by the archivists there and Ángeles Magdalena, especially, about how to access and situate these new materials. Shortly after, Gilbert Joseph coorganized with Daniela Spenser and others an international conference in Mexico City on Latin America in the Cold War, which resulted in the important collection *In from the Cold: Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War* (2008). Gil's invitation to participate in the conference and contribute a chapter to the book helped set in motion the intellectual and investigative trajectory for what I knew would be called—even then, or

so it seems—"The Last Good Neighbor." Over many years and across various projects, Gil has been a generous interlocutor whose collegiality and professional support are a model for others to follow.

The conceptual framework of the project evolved considerably following a 2005 research grant from the Mellon Foundation for "New Directions in Scholarly Research." That funding allowed me to venture to the National Archives in Kew Gardens, England, a cross-Atlantic excursion that at the time seemed quite the novelty for a modern Latin Americanist to take. Gaining a European perspective on Mexican politics and foreign relations was more enlightening than I could have imagined and truly encouraged a "new direction" in my scholarship. Throughout this period, I was teaching at Franklin and Marshall College, and I am grateful for the research and sabbatical support extended to me. I had many wonderful colleagues at F&M, foremost among whom was Van Gosse, whose writings on the New Left and commitment to political activism continue to influence and inspire. The research assistance of Sarah Beckhart, an undergraduate at F&M who is now completing her doctoral studies at Columbia University, proved invaluable. I am deeply appreciative of her transcription of several interviews (with often way too shoddy sound quality) and location of materials from the Mexican press that have made it into chapter 2 of the book.

Stony Brook University has been my institutional home since 2011, and I feel privileged to be surrounded by many brilliant yet intellectually generous colleagues. I wish especially to thank Michael Barnhart for reading and commenting on several chapters of the book. His knowledge and insights into diplomatic history pushed me to clarify and sharpen key aspects of the argument. Brooke Larson read an initial draft of the introduction and provided very helpful comments. Paul Gootenberg's threats and cajoling pushed me to rethink the time frame of the book, which in the end proved a wise decision. Paul Firbas in the Department of Hispanic Languages and Literature graciously hosted me during a visit to Princeton University to consult the Carlos Fuentes Papers. A Stony Brook Faculty in the Arts, Humanities and Lettered Social Sciences (FAHSS) research grant in the summer of 2015 provided funding to spend several weeks in the archives of Mexico's Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE). This, too, was a new direction for me and the experience proved transformative at a key moment in the evolution of the project. In 2017–18 a Faculty Research Fellowship provided the necessary release from teaching, which allowed me to finally get over the hump and begin to see light at the end of the tunnel. The reference and ILL staff at Melville Library were immensely gracious and

efficient in helping me locate materials and track down errant citations during copy editing.

I have also benefited immensely from our stellar graduate student cohort. A Directed Readings course in 2014 on "The Global Sixties" with Ashley Black, David Yee, and Emmanuel Pardo helped lay the conceptual framework for key ideas that later took more concrete form. Ashley provided generous feedback on several earlier chapter drafts, and I am especially appreciative of our ongoing intellectual and pedagogical discussions. The lively conversations and feedback on a draft of the book manuscript in my 2019 graduate seminar on "The Global Sixties" were tremendously helpful, as have been my ongoing conversations about humor, music, and aesthetic practices with Matías Hermosilla and Giovanni Bello. A particular note of thanks goes to David Yee, who took time out from his dissertation investigations in Mexico City to track down random requests I sent his way. Thanks also to María-Clara Torres, who transcribed my interview with Enrique Semo, and to Zaira Barajas for locating and assembling in legible order the statistics on foreign trade.

Several of the chapters from the book have benefited from stimulating feedback provided at various stages by audiences at workshops, conference panels, and numerous invited talks over the years. I am appreciative of the many invitations I have received across a wide variety of settings, both in the United States and abroad. In particular, I would like to thank Renata Keller and Christy Thornton for commenting on drafts of chapters 1 and 4, respectively, at two different sessions of New York University's Cold War History Workshop. Additional comments by David Reid, Tim Naftali, and Barbara Weinstein at those seminars were very helpful. A special note of thanks to Barbara, who generously offered me use of her New York University office during my transition year between F&M and Stony Brook, at a time when having a space to think and write was beyond value. I also wish to thank Jaime Pensado for his friendship and collegiality over the years and for his invitations on several occasions to contribute to the productive intellectual dialogue regarding Mexico and Latin America in the 1960s that has unfolded at Notre Dame over time. In 2015 I had the chance to present a version of chapter 3 at the beloved Washington Area Seminar of Latin American Historians (hosted that year by the University of Maryland). Feedback from John Tutino, Matt Karush, Daniel Richter, and others on a version of chapter 3 was enormously encouraging and helpful. Luis Herrán provided insightful feedback on earlier versions of chapters 4 and 5, and our conversations about the field of the global sixties over the years have been truly enlightening.

I am deeply appreciative of Mark Wasserman and John Coatsworth, each of whom read the entire draft manuscript. Mark's piercing yet constructive criticisms (I expected no less!) pushed me to clarify the larger ideas and what was at stake, while John encouraged me to think of the broader historical trajectory of Mexico's pursuit of balancing. John's friendship dates to my time as his student at the University of Chicago, and the influence of his sharp, cut-to-the-bone logic continues to have a lasting impact on me to this day. Although he is no longer with us, I thought often of the late Friedrich Katz, another advisor from my days at Chicago, as I was researching and writing this book. Friedrich's way of seeing the world, and of Mexico's central place in it, directly influenced me as a student and beyond. I hope the final product is one he, too, would have appreciated. Another senior colleague to whom I owe a great debt of appreciation is Mary Kay Vaughan, whose professional and intellectual support over the years has been a constant.

I cannot imagine arriving at this point without the friendship and spirited intellectual engagement of Elisa Servín, someone who has been a continuous source of encouragement as I wrestled with the narrative and conceptual parameters of this project. Similarly, Vania Markarian has been a tremendous friend and a sounding board for ideas; her insights and research into political culture in Uruguay during the global sixties continue to influence me in numerous ways. I also wish to express my sincere appreciation to Soledad Loaeza, who responded warmly to my initial queries and provided generous feedback on parts of the manuscript, in particular chapter 6. Our luncheon forays during her *estancias* in New York City have been a pleasure. Finally, my research trips to Mexico City would not have been the same without the lasting friendships of John Mraz, Pacho Paredes, Federico Rubli, and Pablo Yankelevich. A special note of *gracias* to John for sharing with me the Hermanos Mayo photo of protests against Lyndon Johnson, which he showed in a presentation at Stony Brook and which appears in chapter 8. Also in Mexico, my recent acquaintance with Vanni Pettinà has sparked an important and wonderful dialogue. I am deeply indebted to his research and writings, and for bringing to light various Soviet documents that have radically transformed our understanding of Mexican-Soviet relations in the first half of the 1960s.

The manuscript benefited tremendously from the diligent and engaged reading it received from two outside reviewers. Each provided insightful comments and suggestions that encouraged me to clarify arguments and remain attentive to certain themes and actors to which I had failed to give adequate due. I especially wish to thank Patrick Iber for graciously sharing

with me his trove of documents linking Lázaro Cárdenas to the Tricontinental Conference, some of which I have incorporated into chapter 8. Many others, too numerous to mention or even recall, have provided insights and passed along tidbits of information over the years, and I wish to extend my sincere thanks to all of them. Thank you in that regard to Andra Chastain for sharing with me her data on the Mexico City metro, as well as to Lincoln Cushing, Paul Gillingham, Luis González-Reimann, and Andrew Paxman for their sustained friendship and hospitality.

My family and friends stateside have been a tremendous support over these years. You are too numerous to list but thank you for your continued inquiries ("How is your book coming along?"), patient listening, and never waning enthusiasm. It has truly meant a lot to me. The chance to talk sixties culture and cinema with my brother Jason is always a treat, while getting free passes to hear sounds from the era locally at Forest Hills Stadium courtesy of my brother Andrew has been awesome. Without *playing* music, moreover, it would be hard to imagine keeping my sanity throughout this process. While it lasted, a weekly open mic night at the Red Pipe Café (where many a manuscript chapter was revised) brought together a group of fun-loving musicians dedicated to quality folk music. And in the final year of writing, I was fortunate to connect with an incredibly talented group of musicians hosted by David Bowler, which provided a creative outlet far more relaxing than writing. My good friends Scott Latzky and Scott McDonald have been a pillar of emotional support and font for inspired distraction over these years. Without their friendship, I don't know how I might have successfully moved forward to completion on this endeavor. Finally, I wish to thank the more recent friendships and support of our community here in Forest Hills. To everyone who has shown an interest in the project and provided encouragement along the way, a sincere thank you.

The late Valerie Millholland at Duke University Press was an early champion of this book before I even understood where it was headed. Her steadfast belief in building up the Latin American catalog at Duke helped transform the field, and it is an honor to be counted among those whose projects she championed. Her baton was passed on to the equally steadfast editorial leadership of Gisela Fosado. Gisela's kindness of spirit and reassurances along the way helped calm nerves and keep me focused on finishing. I wish also to thank the excellent production/editorial team at DUP who have shepherded this book into print and David Prout for his work on the index.

In the time it has taken me to write this book I have been blessed not only with the birth but, alas, the coming-of-age of three wondrous children: Sascha, Chloe, and Naomi. I'd like to think that I didn't miss out on *too*

much of their childhood; hopefully, from their perspective, the same holds true. Aside from assuming their dad is forever running to his office and arriving late for afterschool pickup, I do hope I've been able to impart several invaluable lessons along the way: that writing is hard (even for grown-ups), an office can be messy (but not your room), and books, including this one, still matter.

Finally, none of this wonder much less sense of accomplishment would be remotely conceivable without the love, support, and insights of my partner, Terri. Writing a book in a household with three young children directly supports the scientific research that the gendered division of household labor is far from even. Terri has kept our ship of state upright and headed in the proper direction in spite of my periodic travels, professional obligations, and sundry distractions—not to mention my hoarding of every spare moment to work on the manuscript. Equally appreciated is her intellectual encouragement and keen copyeditor's eye, which has helped sharpen my prose and strap down those dangling modifiers. And now that I'm finally done, I promise to get to that long checklist of things I've pledged to do. (Any idea where I put that list?)

Introduction

Mexico in the Global Sixties

This is a book about Mexican internationalism during a pivotal moment in the global Cold War, when the possibilities for a reconfiguration of geopolitical alignments and revolutionary transformations in global capitalism seemed real, if not imminent. It explores the ways in which Mexico's leadership leveraged the nation's Good Neighbor strategic relationship with the United States to take advantage of an international environment rendered newly competitive by the advent of decolonialization and the appeal of socialist models of development. More fundamentally, it inserts Mexico into a larger conversation taking place among scholars who are conducting research into Cold War political culture, social mobilization, and diplomacy from a transnational perspective.[1] At the same time, *The Last Good Neighbor* seeks to move away from a singular focus on repression—the axiomatic point of reference for virtually all scholars of Mexico in this period—to take into fuller account the question of *aspiration*. It thus directly contributes to the complex cartographical project referred to as the "global sixties," an emergent field of research that centers peripheral actors as agents of historical transformation and as the progenitors of noncapitalist imaginaries. Visions of a global reordering did not turn out the way many anticipated, yet new ways of being in the world nevertheless came about, not only among individuals but also in the order of nations.

Mostly, this book focuses on the first half of the global sixties (1958–66), a period marked by the optimism of "coexistence" and a vision of solidarity among developing nations as they sought through institutional means to redefine the rules of global trade and development. In that respect, it largely (though not exclusively) focuses on the presidency of Adolfo López Mateos (1958–64), for it was during his watch that the postwar, Cold War order first came under siege, and it was he who laid the groundwork for Mexico's far more radical internationalist stance under President Luis Echeverría in the 1970s. Mexican internationalism had been an integral component of the nation's identity since the 1920s, but it was under López Mateos that Mexicans truly came to recognize themselves as coveted players on the global stage.

His presidency also coincides with the evolution and subsequent collapse of a "New Left." For a brief period, this New Left—whose organizational nucleus was located in a broad oppositional movement, the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN, Movement of National Liberation)—found agreement around a collective set of values, practices, and heroes. By 1962, however, underlying fissures had come to the fore and the consensus on how to achieve *peace*, *emancipation*, and *liberation*—keywords of the global 1960s—was rapidly collapsing. In retrospect, the Tricontinental Conference hosted by Cuba in 1966 marked the climax and signaled a turning point of the global sixties. By then, the "Spirit of Bandung"—an idea rooted in the conference of former colonial nations at Bandung, Indonesia (1955), that gave impetus to a "Third World" collective imaginary—had shattered against the ideological nails of the Sino-Soviet split and the reality of competing geopolitical positions.[2] The second half of the global sixties (dealt with briefly in chapter 8 and in the epilogue) was characterized by a proliferation of splinterings, as the Left was torn asunder by competing visions of utopia and how to get there.

While 1968 was a year that culminated in rupture and most obviously aligns Mexico within ongoing discussions of a "global '68," this is not a book that will spend much time on the student movement of 1968. It is important that we break free of this particular historiographic focal point. We must move, as the title of a recent collection aptly puts it, "beyond 1968." Only by doing so will we allow ourselves to see and explore alternative historical narratives and to reconceptualize how we approach the relationship between state and society in this critical "long decade" (ca. 1958–73). Although 1968, of course, constituted a decisive year, it was mostly because the global student protests fleetingly channeled these extant strands of dissent into a seemingly cohesive uprising, before being

crushed by governmental forces or, just as often, dissolving in the face of ideological and cultural entropy. The fragmentations that resulted from this combination of repression and disillusionment carried over into new countercultural alignments and political imaginaries that bore scant resemblance to those at the start of the decade. This book seeks to contribute to this historiographical shift underway, to guide our attention back to the question of origins and simultaneously to widen our frame of analysis in order to accommodate a vantage point that is intrinsically global.[3]

Three intersecting narrative arcs and levels of analysis establish the core framework of this book. The first is a national-level story about the relationship between Mexican foreign policy making and left-wing political mobilization. As a rising midtier country with a relatively stable political system (governed by the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional [PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party]), an expanding industrial base, and an ambitious president who coveted the global stage, Mexico was uniquely situated to play a pivotal role within a Cold War playing field that appeared newly malleable. Dramatic transformations in regional and international geopolitics beginning in the late 1950s and into the mid-1960s created a window of opportunity for Mexico to establish new diplomatic alliances and pursue new trading partners in a grand strategy aimed at counterbalancing—though not dislodging—the preponderant influence of the United States. I identify this strategy of counterbalancing as Mexico's "global pivot." Although in economic terms the results were disappointing, by the mid-1960s Mexico was widely regarded as having acquired a level of global stature that elevated it into being a nation of consequence.

Previous histories of Mexico in the 1960s have downplayed this internationalism, addressed it separately from the sphere of domestic politics, or focused singularly on Mexico's relationship with revolutionary Cuba as a substitute for the whole. Unfortunately, López Mateos kept no diary during his presidency and left no memoir. Upon stepping down he immediately succumbed to the debilitating effects of multiple aneurysms and became an invalid; he died at the age of sixty in 1969. What we know about his intentions as well as frustrations, therefore, must be gleaned from the documentary record—rich but nevertheless limited, in the case of Mexico's Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE, Secretariat of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Foreign Relations)—and the voices of those who surrounded him, both his supporters and critics.[4] General histories of Mexico, for instance, tend to dismiss the seriousness of intent (much less outcome) by President López Mateos to transform Mexico's role in the global order. Enrique Krauze, in his widely popular text, *Mexico: Biography of Power*, deals

with this internationalism only cursorily before summing up the period by stating with anodyne appreciation how López Mateos was "Mexico's ambassador to the world."[5] Various texts examine the history of Mexican foreign relations, including efforts to diversify the nation's diplomatic and economic relations during the 1960s. But while these examinations establish an important bedrock for any analysis of Mexican foreign policy in this period, they overwhelmingly retain a US-centered frame of reference and lack the benefit of access to new archival research that allows one to investigate not only outcome but also motives and intent. Moreover, written by specialists in international relations, these studies lack a wider conceptual framework that might encompass the role not only of ideology and culture but of the contestation of global imaginaries that characterized the period.[6]

More common is to find the question of internationalism conflated with Mexican support for the Cuban Revolution. While studies in this vein successfully integrate the international with the domestic sphere of politics and ideology, these interpretations nevertheless fail to take into account a larger global picture, one that transcends the centrality of Fidel Castro per se. Thus, they largely reduce the idea of foreign policy making to a political calculation aimed at appeasing left-wing domestic critics.[7] My argument is aligned with a more recent set of writings that reexamine Mexico and Latin America's engagement with the Soviet Union and with the political energies set in motion by the post-Bandung movements.[8] By allowing ourselves to pull away from the question of Cuba, we see how López Mateos sought to leverage Mexico's strategic potential to prop up the forces of nonalignment and shape the dispute initiated by peripheral actors to reform the rules of global capitalism. Mexico's geopolitical ambitions were genuine; they were not simply part of a strategy by the ruling party (PRI) to co-opt and contain a domestic Left energized by the Cuban Revolution. Indeed, I argue how in key respects left-wing political mobilization and presidential aspirations for a new global order not only coincided but were mutually constitutive.

The early 1960s in Mexico was characterized by the emergence of a far-reaching left-wing social movement, the MLN. As an outcrop of the Soviet-backed World Peace Council (WPC), the MLN had direct links to an agenda aimed at widening the scope of "fellow travelers" who might support the ideological positions of the Communist Party. But the MLN was also energized by the revolutionary tumult unleashed by the Cuban Revolution and guided (initially) by the leadership of former Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40). Moreover, it was a movement shaped by the spirit of

Bandung and thus characterized by the competing ideological strands that defined the Left during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In short, the MLN was a movement whose political roots and ideological influences were simultaneously local, regional, and international. Previous historical interpretations have regarded this moment of political effervescence and of the reemergence of Lázaro Cárdenas, in particular, as a direct threat to López Mateos and to the legitimacy of the ruling PRI. Indeed, various domestic and foreign observers at the time spoke in dire terms and with increasing alarm at the possibility of Cárdenas leading a new revolution or of forming an opposition party that would challenge the PRI's monopoly on power. In either case, the political stability of the nation and the impact of US strategic relations with Mexico were assumed to be at stake.[9]

This book, however, offers a very different interpretation of both Cárdenas and the neo-*cardenista* movement that coalesced into the MLN. For one, rather than viewing Cárdenas as a threat to the system, he emerges in this narrative as a trusted diplomatic interlocutory, someone who facilitated early aspects of the regime's internationalist aspirations and a stabilizing force domestically—an "elder revolutionary statesman" capable of containing the fractious forces of left-wing dissatisfaction. Indeed, Cárdenas was in constant communication with López Mateos and repeatedly deferred to his authority, knowing full well that the inherent stability of the system depended on unqualified respect for the office of the presidency. At the same time, he became a convenient lightning rod for the media's attacks on the Left and thus helped deflect criticism away from the president, whose positions on Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the forces of nonalignment generated unease among various sectors of the population. Second, while the MLN clearly played the role of antagonist to López Mateos, it was also an ally. Notably, virtually all of the central tenets of the MLN's domestic and international program directly coincided with the stated goals of López Mateos and the platform of the PRI. As Jaime Pensado has underscored, the objectives of the MLN were fundamentally reformist, "revolutionary" but with a small "r."[10] There were, to be sure, revolutionary actors—those with a capital "R"—embedded within the movement, and these actors did gain ascendency as the MLN collapsed as a political force after 1963. But what others have missed in their analyses of this period is the fact that López Mateos sought to harness the energies of the MLN in direct support of his internationalist agenda—a "global pivot" away from economic reliance and diplomatic subordination to the United States. Paradoxically, the wellspring of popular support for this pivot toward global engagement derived less from the middle classes, which had benefited most from the increasingly close

ties with the United States, than the left-wing coalition that was mobilizing around Lázaro Cárdenas. In short, the president *needed* the support of the MLN, at least initially, to deepen his political base and make evident to relevant US actors that his actions on the global stage had broad domestic support. Thus, while López Mateos contained and repressed various aspects and actors related to the MLN, he simultaneously cultivated and shielded others, such as the young novelist and highly influential intellectual Carlos Fuentes, who served as a key interlocutor between the regime and social movements in opposition.

Indeed, support from the intelligentsia formed the nexus point of the PRI's political hegemony. The breakdown of the close, if oftentimes fraught, relationship between left-wing intellectuals under López Mateos and his successor, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, set the stage for the violence that culminated in the massacre of students in 1968 and confirms Roderic Camp's analysis of the centrality of intellectuals to Mexican political stability in this period. "If the political leadership attempts to govern without the tacit support of at least a portion of the intellectual community," Camp writes, "it will increasingly resort to the use of force."[11] But at the same time, I demonstrate how left-wing discourse was impacted, on the one hand, by the charged debates over revolutionary theory and *compromiso* (political commitment) and, on the other, by irreverent attacks on social and political norms linked to the dissemination of countercultural aesthetics and interpretative stances emanating from the capitalist West. Thus the causes for the fragmentation of the Left, which had direct ramifications for the integrity of the MLN as an opposition movement, were not only political but epistemological as well.

At a second level of narrative and analysis, this book is situated within a regional and, more so, bilateral framework of US-Mexico relations. Any examination of Mexican domestic and international politics in this period inevitably requires that we factor in the influence of the United States. Yet it is equally important that we transcend a singular focus on that influence. In an important earlier study regarding the impact of the Cuban Revolution on Mexican domestic politics, Olga Pellicer de Brody argued that the economic leverage exercised by the United States "placed in doubt the notion that Mexico was capable of acting with complete independence in the international sphere."[12] While that was certainly true if one focuses on "complete," Pellicer de Brody's definitive statement occludes the fact that Mexico during the period of López Mateos *pursued* an independent foreign policy, one that significantly extended beyond that of support for revolutionary Cuba. What Mexico's goals were and how the United States

confronted the reality of a subordinate, strategic ally intent on pushing against the unstated parameters of "independence" are among the central questions explored in this book. They dovetail, as well, with a new wave of research that has begun to address geopolitics from a Latin American perspective during this period. As Tanya Harmer and others have argued, we must seek to escape the vortex of a "historiographic Monroe Doctrine," the notion that hemispheric relations can be understood solely or even primarily within an analytical rubric of US dominance and that Latin American agency exists only in relationship to the United States.[13]

To be certain, this vortex is particularly acute when discussing Mexico. The US-Mexico border was and remains the only meeting point in which a First World and Third World nation are conjoined. In an era defined by Soviet ideological competition and the contentious politics of decolonization, Mexico's relationship with the United States assumed a new level of significance, both strategically as well as symbolically. By the early 1960s Mexico had become a geopolitical battleground. Mexico was the strategic and ideological lynchpin of the Pan-American alliance, and its diplomatic policies carried weight. As Michael J. Dziedzic writes, "Mexico was prized as a *geopolitical* fulcrum" critical to the dominance (and perceived security) of the United States regionally and beyond.[14] This battleground was defined far more broadly than Mexico's defense of revolutionary Cuba, though to be certain that element encapsulated US frustrations and fears. Indeed, we must move beyond a singular focus on the impact of the Cuban Revolution in our discussion not only of Mexico but of Latin America more broadly in this era. Without question, the influence of Fidel Castro was paradigmatic. Yet the attention garnered by the Cuban Revolution has obscured competing story lines and has tended to render an overly reductionist analytical framework for interpreting Mexican domestic and international politics. Inevitably, Castro, *los barbudos* (namesake for the "bearded" revolutionaries), and the ideological influence of the Cuban Revolution are central factors to this book, but they do not stand for the whole of external influences nor the Left's project of "emancipation." By looking past the Cuban Revolution, this book seeks to gain a broader perspective not only of the multitudinous, transnational forces that shaped Mexican political subjectivities but, equally important, to acknowledge Mexican diplomatic aspirations to engage—and not simply co-opt for domestic purposes—key elements of what Vijay Prashad denotes as the "Third World project."[15]

The bigger picture I show is one that reflected Washington's concern that President López Mateos, through his aggressive search for alternative trading partners, open identification with (while not formally joining)

the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and evident determination to lay the groundwork for a new international economic order, constituted a grand strategy aimed at abetting a "diffusion of power" at US expense.[16] Paradoxically, however, President López Mateos's drive to diversify Mexico's relations and his aspirations for a more just world order depended on and ultimately reinforced the country's strategic partnership with the United States. The straitjacket of proximity to the United States—the predominant source of capital investment, loans, markets, and tourism—became the driving force behind the country's newfound internationalism. Indeed, the two tendencies were deeply intertwined. Hence, the closer López Mateos seemed to draw to the United States, as reflected in a series of highly successful reciprocal presidential visits and other acts of cultural diplomacy, the more emboldened he felt to challenge the constraints of US hegemony.

This paradox was undergirded and enabled by the strategic discourse of the Good Neighbor, a diplomatic framework dating from the 1930s premised on "mutual respect." Most authors who examine the Good Neighbor Policy emphasize its historical specificity tied to the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt or, at best, its definitive rupture following the overthrow, orchestrated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), of President Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala (1954). A noted historian of the subject, for instance, argues that after the intervention in Guatemala, "the voice of the Good Neighbor was no longer heard in the land."[17] Other recent studies on Latin America in the Cold War similarly take as a given the irrelevance of the Good Neighbor in the wake of the Cuban Revolution and further US intervention in the region.[18] Yet the Good Neighbor sustained an afterlife in Mexico that was unique to US relations with Latin America more generally. Moreover, the symbolic language of the Good Neighbor became *the* discursive thread that wed the two nations together in a mutually symbiotic yet oftentimes fraught geopolitical arrangement, a "marriage of convenience," as one prominent study later put it.[19]

Several reasons help explain the staying power of the discourse of the Good Neighbor. It is perhaps not insignificant that the first use of the term dates to the document that codified the existence of a legal boundary between the two nations, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848). In establishing a formal end to the Mexican-American War, the treaty declared in its preamble that "the two Peoples should live, as good Neighbours."[20] While the phrase no doubt preexisted as a clichéd popular expression, its integration into this founding document of US-Mexican relations nevertheless underscores its essential qualities as a point of diplomatic refer-

ence into the future, not only for the bilateral relationship but as a building block of Pan-Americanism itself. A second reason is that as the stated policy under President Roosevelt, the Good Neighbor directly shielded Mexico from intervention following President Lázaro Cárdenas's expropriation of US oil companies in 1938. The expropriation proved a supreme test of the principle of nonintervention that formed the bedrock promise of Roosevelt's policy and cemented in the mind-set of Mexicans across the political spectrum a standard against which to measure trust in US aims and objectives. Finally, there was the unusual degree of attention given to Mexico through US cultural diplomacy during World War II, the apex of the Good Neighbor Policy. Alongside Brazil, Mexico was one of only two Latin American nations to join the allied war effort in a military capacity, and the two countries became famously celebrated in popular culture as trustworthy strategic partners. The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA)—the institution responsible for leading the cultural diplomatic offensive under the Good Neighbor—gave special recognition to Mexican representation in film, music, and other forms of propaganda.[21] This wartime attention helped cement in the popular imaginaries of both the US and Mexican publics a sense of exclusivity of purpose and friendship, one that carried over into the postwar period even more so than in other national contexts. Elsewhere, political polarization contributed to a more rapid dissipation of Good Neighbor sentiment. The special feelings conveyed by Americans for Mexico were amply revealed when in May 1947 one million people lined the streets of Broadway in New York City to participate in a ticker-tape parade marking the arrival of recently elected president Miguel Alemán (1946–52). As the *New York Times* reported, "pretty girls . . . shrilled 'Viva!' from offices and from factory windows," while "home-wending New Yorkers paused at the curbs to cheer, applaud and call 'Viva Aleman!' and 'Viva Mexico!'"[22] In cheering President Alemán, Americans were at one level celebrating the recent defeat of fascism, in which Mexico had played its own, not insignificant part.[23] Yet more broadly, with the war over, Americans were eager to demonstrate that Mexico and the United States would remain the best of Good Neighbors.[24] This invocation of the discourse of the Good Neighbor carried over well in the 1960s as the two nations derived strategic benefit in their mutual reaffirmation of friendship in a world of rapidly mutating political sentiment.

At the same time, however, Mexico's foreign policy pronouncements and professed interest in establishing new diplomatic alignments produced tremendous consternation and tactical handwringing within the State Department. Washington diplomats and analysts struggled to decipher the logic of

the ruling party's revolutionary nationalism and of President López Mateos's internationalist aspirations in an era of geopolitical uncertainty. The Good Neighbor framework, I argue, proved resilient enough to accommodate Mexican independence; each government mined for their respective (yet not necessarily overlapping) strategic rationale the inherent value in sustaining the *idea* of Good Neighborliness long after the phrase had fallen out of fashion elsewhere in the Americas. If, as others have demonstrated, Washington found advantage in having Mexico sustain diplomatic ties with Cuba, there was a broader opportunity gained by policy makers in allowing for a semblance of Mexican foreign policy autonomy more generally: to demonstrate the credibility of mutual respect, the principle at the heart of the Good Neighbor promise. During the succeeding presidency of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–70), Mexico's relative retreat from the global stage all but assured that "independence" remained a policy denoted by quotation marks. Indeed, by 1966, following the US invasion of the Dominican Republic and a deepening military commitment in Vietnam, Mexico had become, as the title of this book suggests, the "last Good Neighbor." By that point in time the logic of revolutionary nationalism had been cracked, the parameters of geopolitical independence had become more clearly defined, and the contours of a strategic symbiosis were now explicitly acknowledged. Nevertheless, by forging a nationalist identity that was intertwined with a defense of the rights of peripheral nations, López Mateos had established a trajectory that would be difficult to contain and which, following the interregnum of Díaz Ordaz, would reemerge as official policy in the 1970s and 1980s. How this transpired within the framework of a deepening strategic partnership with the United States constitutes the central story of this book.

The final level of narrative and analysis is one that situates my argument squarely within the wider conceptual framework of the global sixties. This emergent field reflects the merger of two distinctive phrasings that came together relatively recently to constitute the broader rubric of a global sixties historiographic agenda. The first of these is the *long 1960s*, a term first used by Arthur Marwick in his effort to periodize cultural transformations across Western Europe and the United States that appeared to share interlinking causes and outcomes.[25] The fact that Marwick's phrase has subsequently been embraced by many other scholars analyzing this period in countries far afield from those he originally discussed has led to a historiographic consensus that dramatic cultural changes occurred simultaneously across a wide range of countries during the approximate period 1958–73. A central component of the global sixties agenda there-

fore is to understand the transnational connections, at both the structural and individualist level, that can account for this synchrony. The second phrase, *global Cold War*, comes from Odd Westad.[26] Westad broke with the historiographic argument that the Cold War *came to* the Third World and instead showed how anticolonialist nationalism in Africa, Asia, and Latin America was integral to the form and trajectory of the Cold War itself. Among other contributions, *The Global Cold War* decentralized and variegated our understanding of the Cold War. Westad's book shifted the definition away from that of a battle between the Soviet Union and the United States for control "over" nations on the periphery to one that regarded the Third World as constitutive to the battle itself, and thus allowed us to recognize the agency and significance of Third World actors. Like Marwick's phrasing, the "global Cold War" has also been widely embraced by scholars working on Cold War diplomacy from a Third World perspective across a variety of contexts.

The concept of a global sixties integrates the periodization and attention to cultural practices established by Marwick with the global diplomatic and ideological approach to the Cold War introduced by Westad. As Martin Klimke and Mary Nolan write in the introduction to their monumental collection on the subject, the mapping project of the global sixties aims to "reconstruct the multidirectional South-South networks and flows of ideas, activists, and repertoires of protest and explore the two-way exchanges between the South and the North in both its communist and democratic capitalist forms." It involves a broad-minded investigation of "the varieties of internationalism promoted by the Soviets, the US, China, and the Third World that existed alongside of and often in tension with national protest movements and transnational ties."[27] While we should recognize the "long sixties" and "global Cold War" as subsets rather than synonyms for "global sixties," collectively they share an underlying epistemological premise: national actors, political institutions, and cultural practices are all embedded in transnational processes. The nation-state is innately porous and became ever more so in the Cold War era. In sum, we must comprehend the embeddedness of global currents within local histories.

The analytical integration of the axis of geopolitics with that of political culture/aesthetics constitutes the essence of the global sixties agenda. Therefore, while geopolitics is a central focus of analysis in *The Last Good Neighbor*, I also place the role of intellectuals and the ideological contestation over political and cultural signifiers at the heart of my discussion. Despite their apparent unity of purpose, by the early 1960s the Mexican

Left was characterized by profound divisions that were at once ideological as well as epistemological. Such divisions began to define left-wing movements across the globe at the end of the 1950s, as the Soviet Union proved determined to retain its revolutionary authority on a rapidly transmuting world stage. These divisions became the basis internationally for what was to be called a "New Left," one demarcated from an "Old Left" as much by its arguments about the location of revolutionary agency as by the incorporation of new aesthetic sensibilities and cultural practices. For this New Left, the "labour metaphysic," as C. Wright Mills aptly put it, was no longer sacrosanct.[28] Peasants, intellectuals, and rebellious youth all assumed leading roles. The epistemological reordering of Marxist theory and praxis, shaped initially by the anticolonialist movements in Africa and Asia, further impacted by the revolution in Cuba, and influenced by the antipatriarchal revolt of the beatniks and rock 'n' roll, was suffused by a critical reexamination of artistic expression under existing socialism. In returning to the earliest writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, intellectuals within this emergent New Left sought to recover Marxism's original humanism, a philosophical understanding of human beings as creative agents of but also *in* history. This "return to man," as E. P. Thompson framed the critique in 1957, shortly after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalinism, encapsulated the intellectual basis for what became known as "socialist humanism."[29] The question of how one could be both "humanist" (free to think) and "socialist" (committed to collective action) became one of the central debates that contributed to the fragmentation not only of the Mexican Left but globally, and underscores the importance of approaching the New Left not as a singular but as a plural, a "movement of movements," in Van Gosse's rich phrasing.[30]

Three important turning points in Mexico's post-1946 period set the stage for where *The Last Good Neighbor* begins in 1958. The first was the presidential elections of 1952, which were the first since 1940 to be openly contested by a national opposition movement. Led by the ex-revolutionary general Miguel Henríquez Guzmán, the *henriquistas*, as they were called, freely appropriated the image of Cárdenas in their political propaganda and "assured followers that the ex-president supported Henríquez Guzmán's candidacy," a position Cárdenas himself did little explicitly to contradict.[31] As a populist unaffiliated with any of the official parties, Henríquez Guzmán not only represented the promise of a return to the Cárdenas era and thus "the recuperation of worker and peasant conquests" but he also garnered support across the political spectrum (including among disaffected conservatives) as a credible "no" vote to the official PRI party desig-

nate, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines.[32] The subsequent defeat of Henríquez Guzmán through a combination of fraud and repression left a significant mark on a younger generation coming of political age. For a young Carlos Monsiváis (just fourteen years old), destined to become one of his generation's most insightful and influential New Left writers, the defeat of the henriquistas, as he later reflected, "represented my entry into skepticism and disenchantment" with the ruling PRI.[33]

Nostalgia for the socialist policies of former president Cárdenas was used by another charismatic figure who also ran in the 1952 elections and who would remain a central player in Mexican politics into the early 1960s, Vicente Lombardo Toledano. He was the candidate of the Partido Popular (PP, Popular Party), a nationalist party formed by him in 1948 (following his expulsion as leader of the government-led Confederación de Trabajadores de México [CTM, Confederation of Mexican Workers]). The PP had made significant inroads especially among agricultural workers, urban intellectuals, and rural school teachers in opposition to the new direction of the ruling party. By the mid-1950s, the PP had adopted an explicitly Marxist-oriented line but its strategic vision was to support a progressive state "in permanent battle with reactionary capitalists and landowners at home and imperialism abroad."[34] Through his travels to the Soviet Union and Communist China, and with the help of his fiercely loyal supporters, Lombardo Toledano crafted an image of himself as a heroic, larger-than-life personality ready to do battle against the forces of capitalist imperialism, and thus as a stand-in for the absent Lázaro Cárdenas.[35] Yet his leadership of the PP was as a domineering caudillo figure who imposed his authority from above. Moreover, he appeared to have few qualms about entering into self-serving negotiations with the ruling PRI (such as throwing his party's support to the official candidate in 1958 and 1964). Although the party remained popular among rural supporters, by the late 1950s Lombardo Toledano provoked deep cynicism, especially among a younger generation of independent-minded, left-wing intellectuals.[36]

The second turning point was the US-backed coup d'état against Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz in June 1954. Cárdenas had privately defended Guatemala's democratic revolution, praising President Juan José Arévalo (1944–50) in a private letter as an "example for the oppressed nations."[37] When Arévalo's successor, Jacobo Árbenz, came under assault in the Organization of American States (OAS) and faced the threat of a US invasion, Cárdenas conveyed to Guatemala's foreign minister his "personal friendship and sympathy" for Guatemala's revolutionary goals and solidarity in defense of the besieged nation's sovereignty.[38] Despite Washington's

disavowal of any role in the army rebellion that ousted Árbenz, the presumption (later proven true) of US involvement was invoked by the Left to question the sincerity of the decades-old Good Neighbor pledge of nonintervention. In an action meant to highlight the symbolic death of the Good Neighbor, a young Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (the twenty-year-old son of former president Lázaro Cárdenas), accompanied by students of a recently formed group, Consejo Nacional Estudiantil de Solidaridad con el Pueblo de Guatemala (National Student Council in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala), laid a wreath in front of the US Embassy in Mexico City, "in memory of the Good Neighbor Policy."[39] The overthrow of Arbenz was a formative moment in the political evolution of students and intellectuals, one that set the stage for a mistrust among the Left of further US invocations of Good Neighbor sentiment.

A third turning point occurred two years later when Lázaro Cárdenas accepted the Stalin Peace Prize in a ceremony organized by the Movimiento Mexicano por la Paz (Mexican Movement for Peace), the national branch of the WPC. It was the first time in nearly a decade that Cárdenas had appeared in a significant way on the public stage. For a generation of youth who had only known of Cárdenas the legend, the chance to lay eyes on him in person was epic.[40] Cárdenas was unmoved by critics who used his acceptance of the prize as proof of his Communist leanings; nor was he concerned with the award's ill-fated timing. In a connection openly mocked in some quarters of the Mexican press, the prize was bestowed in the wake of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, where Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had just repudiated Joseph Stalin.[41] For Cárdenas, the prize ceremony offered an opportunity to denounce the downfall of the Good Neighbor and to praise Mexico's noninterventionist traditions. The jam-packed auditorium underscored the continued mystique of a heroic figure who was no longer a visible feature on Mexico's otherwise crowded political landscape. As an article in *Excélsior* described the chaotic scene: "The multitude surpassed by several times the occupancy limit; each seat contained up to three people; dozens of men and women hung from the curtains and walls of the amphitheater. And stretching from the doors to the street to the main hall, a compact mass—expectant, enthusiastic—continued to struggle to get in."[42] Cárdenas's acceptance speech was brief and lacked any specificity to recent events, in Guatemala or elsewhere. Its theme was that of *peace*, a term that would emerge as perhaps the most contested trope of the global sixties. "At the present hour there is not a single nation that does not desire peace and work toward its consolidation," the former president stated.

The crowd's ovation lasted nearly five minutes yet Cárdenas, faithful to his moniker, the "Sphinx of Jiquilpán" (a reference to the town of his birth in Michoacán), maintained a presence of absolute inscrutability. "Not a single muscle on his face moved, his lips were immobile, he never smiled,"[43] a reporter noted. Leaving the theater, he needed to wade through a dense, adulatory throng before reaching his waiting car.

Clearly, Cárdenas's moral authority remained supreme within the context of a Mexican Left that was fragmented and unsettled. As explored in chapter 1, "Mexico's 'Restless' Left and the Resurrection of Lázaro Cárdenas," he was the only leader who had the capacity to unite the disparate factions across the Left and thus to act as a bridge, not only between generations but between an "Old" Left—nationalist yet openly identified with Soviet internationalism—and a "New" Left in formation. Throughout the 1940s and for most of the 1950s, Cárdenas had chosen to remain in the shadows of domestic political machinations. He had been determined to stay out of the public realm—away from the reach of supporters as well as detractors. Indeed, his self-restraint played an essential role in constructing a political culture of *presidentialism*, a term used to denote that whoever sat in the presidential chair reigned supreme during his six-year term in office (*sexenio*). Meanwhile, anti-Communism served as a convenient domestic cover for the repression and marginalization from political decision-making not only of the left-wing forces associated with ex-president Cárdenas but also of other vocal critics of the PRI's increasing authoritarianism.[44] By the mid-1950s a deepening web of domestic spying emanated from the Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS, Federal Security Directorate), created by President Miguel Alemán in 1947, and the Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (DGIPS [DIPS], Department of Political and Social Investigationes), an intelligence agency dating to the early postrevolutionary period. The two institutions competed with one another and often overlapped in their surveillance activities. Writing about the DFS, Sergio Aguayo Quezada notes how the range of activities that came under the spy agency's purview was inherently expansive. "The subjects of this vigilance were leftists, unionized workers (oil workers, railway workers), some foreigners, critical journalists, *políticos* who upset those in power, and members of the PRI who decided to join the opposition in pursuit of their own political self-interest," he writes.[45] All of this contributed to what a US Embassy report described as the "crushing centralism of the Mexican political system," one that had brought political stability yet did so by squashing democratic dissent and political alternatives.[46]

In late 1958 Cárdenas embarked on a several-month journey that took him to the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan to "see for himself," as he later put it, the comparative nature of lived socialism versus capitalism. This journey, also explored in chapter 1, signaled a new desire on his part for international engagement at a critical juncture in the Cold War. But his intentions were scarcely oppositional. Indeed, his conversations with Khrushchev helped pave the way for closer Soviet-Mexican ties, and he made a quick retreat to his home in Michoacán upon his return to Mexico. His travels abroad, however, coincided with the unfolding of two paradigmatic events, one national and the other international: the violent crackdown by the PRI of a struggle by breakaway unions and independent-minded workers and the triumph of los barbudos in Cuba. Both events spurred an important conversation among a new generation of left-wing intellectuals—what the State Department described as a "wave of restlessness"—regarding the significance of what it meant to be "on the left" at this historical moment, both in the context of Mexican revolutionary nationalism and more universally.

The United States was not alone in regarding Mexico with strategic interest. Beginning in the mid- to late 1950s, the Soviet Union also looked to Mexico as a key component of a broader effort to normalize Soviet diplomatic, cultural, and trade relations throughout Latin America. Chapter 2, "'Luniks and Sputniks in Chapultepec!,'" focuses on the rapid intensification of Soviet-Mexican relations during the high point of Khrushchev's strategy of Peaceful Coexistence, a period that coincided with the respite of a brief Cold War détente. Soviet Russia could claim its own distinctive relationship with Mexico, as nations whose revolutions were practically coterminous and whose postrevolutionary states mirrored one another in important respects. In fact, the Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM, Mexican Communist Party) was the oldest in the hemisphere, though it was also among the weakest. As Barry Carr writes, the 1950s "were an almost complete disaster" for the PCM, which was harassed by government security agents, plagued by internecine ideological disputes (exacerbated by the 1956 denunciations of Stalin), and disadvantaged in competition against the PRI and PP.[47] "Indeed, I have served in no country where [the] Communist danger was less," the British ambassador would note at the start of 1958.[48] Yet both in Mexico and globally, the Soviet Union had positioned itself as the ideological counterpoint to the "imperialism" of Western capitalism. In that role, the international Communist movement spearheaded (if not necessarily controlled) by the Soviet Union served simultaneously as threat and foil for Mexico's ruling party—Communists and fellow travelers

were labeled by the media as *exóticos* (exotic, that is, *outside* the nationalist body politic). Yet despite the PCM's practical irrelevance to the labor movement (in comparison with Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil, for instance) and an official discourse of anti-Communism, the Soviet Union nevertheless retained a strong cultural influence on Mexican national consciousness. Mexico's two most prominent living muralists, David Alfaro Siqueiros and Diego Rivera, were PCM members (despite Rivera's on-again, off-again relationship with the party) and vocal supporters of Soviet socialist advances, but more broadly speaking many Mexicans had come to regard the Soviet Union with a certain awe and respect. Soviet postwar industrial and technological prowess—epitomized by the launch of the world's first satellite into space in 1957—suggested to many, not only in Mexico but globally, that socialism was indeed the wave of the future.

Mexico came to embrace on its own terms an expansionist Soviet politics, but this engagement reflected a more generalized, concerted effort to fortify ties with other nations as potential balancers to counter the disproportionate economic, cultural, and political influence exerted by the United States. Chapter 3, "Mexico's New Internationalism," sets the stage for Mexico's global pivot and positions this ambitious foreign policy against the need to harness the Left, on the one hand, and uphold the framework of the Good Neighbor, on the other, all within the tumultuous context of the Cuban Revolution. Indeed, a strategy of diversification provided a political window of opportunity not only for the Soviet Union—eager to establish a place of diplomatic respectability and influence at the doorstep of the United States—but West European nations and Japan as well, which likewise were eager to claim an economic stake in the so-called Mexican Miracle. Exemplifying this view was the urgent, final summation in the fall of 1960 by Britain's ambassador to Mexico, who argued that now was the "ideal moment" to deepen Anglo-Mexican ties in order to "associate ourselves with the tremendous growth of the Mexican economy." Mexico, he argued, merited the highest attention as part of a broader British strategy toward Latin America. If the present opportunity was squandered, he warned, "in ten years' time the rich openings now available to us will have been snapped up by our rivals in the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and elsewhere and we shall once again be out in the cold."[49]

However, 1960 was also a pivotal year in the embrace, transformation, and contestation over the values of *emancipation*, *solidarity*, and *nonalignment*. Chapter 4, "The 'Spirit of Bandung' in Mexican National Politics," examines how these themes had resonance not only for the Mexican Left but within government circles as well. This chapter examines the pivotal

role played by Cárdenas during this year of confrontational politics, when the initial hope for a "peaceful coexistence" intersected with the ardor of revolutionary nationalism. Cárdenas was simultaneously an instigator of left-wing revolt yet also a stabilizer, one whose position was essential to López Mateos's ability to harness the forces of the Left in support of his domestic and international agenda. A key component of that agenda was López Mateos's embrace of the politics of nonalignment, a geopolitical proposal conjured by leading postcolonial personalities, and one that was viewed with optimism within Mexico yet apprehension by the United States.

By the start of 1962, concerns about Latin America's potential "drift toward neutralism" had reached the highest echelons of strategic policy discussion within the Western alliance. The declaration by López Mateos that Mexico, while not "neutral," was nevertheless "independent" had become a reflection of a wider trend. Moreover, as the keystone of the entire Pan-American alliance, curtailing Mexican regional and global ambitions became of paramount importance to the United States. These themes are explored in chapter 5, "The 'Preferred Revolution,'" which focuses on President John F. Kennedy's visit to Mexico City in the summer of 1962 and Washington's strategic calculation to couple Mexico ideologically to the recently launched Alliance for Progress. The visit solidified Good Neighbor sentiment by washing away residual fears and frustrations on both sides that had built up around responses to the Cuban Revolution. But at the same time, it emboldened López Mateos to take a *more* active role in the post-Bandung order taking shape, in particular around efforts to formulate a "new economic order" that would give greater weight to the financial demands of developing nations.

Before getting to that discussion, however, chapter 6, "New Left Splits," backtracks chronologically in order to focus on the internal politics of the Left and the collapse of the MLN as a viable opposition force. The novelist and public intellectual Carlos Fuentes plays a central role in this narrative as an interlocutor. Fuentes sought to mediate not only the competing ideological stances within the MLN but between the MLN and López Mateos, as well as between Mexico and the United States. By the summer of 1962, however, what the caricaturist Jorge Carreño depicted as the "drama of the left" had come into the open. This drama had local political causes, but it was also driven by global ideological factors related to the Sino-Soviet split. At the same time, the divisions between an "Old" and "New" Left were further exacerbated by an epistemological split *within* the New Left itself over the question of revolutionary subjectivity, a split I conceptualize as between a "vanguardist" and "cosmopolitan" Left.

Returning to the theme of the global pivot, chapter 7, "Apex of Internationalism," examines the climactic final two years of the López Mateos government (1962–64), the period of his most sustained activism on the global stage. The era marked the apex of NAM as a coherent force for global transformation—signaled by the success of the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Economic Development (UNCTAD) and the second NAM conference held in Cairo—but it also heralded NAM's pending demise. Competing ideological tendencies within the "Third World project" were aggravated by the centripetal pull of the Sino-Soviet split; meanwhile, divergent economic interests among developing nations belied the vision of innate solidarity. The chapter explores how Yugoslavian president Josip Broz Tito made an all-out effort to save NAM by bringing in Mexican (and Latin American) support. At the same moment, French president Charles de Gaulle also openly wooed Mexico (and Latin America) as central to his own strategic calculus to chisel away at US-Soviet bipolarity in order to foment a multipolar landscape. Mexico was, in the eyes of the British, a sought-after "debutante" on the world stage, and a nation whose newfound independence and clear desire to be at the center of global affairs tested the limits of Washington's tolerance as never before.

The final chapter, "The Last Good Neighbor," addresses a central question: why, at the pinnacle of Mexico's global pivot, did President Díaz Ordaz (1964–70) turn away from the activist foreign policy of his predecessor? The answer, I argue, lies not only in differences of temperament but in transformations in the global order that increased the risks and diminished the potential benefits of continuing the activist foreign policy set in motion under López Mateos. Instead, Díaz Ordaz capitalized on Mexico's unique alliance with the United States, exemplified by the surprise visit of President Lyndon B. Johnson to Mexico City in the spring of 1966. The turn away from a progressive agenda abroad, however, coincided with a series of confrontations between Díaz Ordaz and the nation's left-wing intelligentsia. For the first time in the nation's postrevolutionary period, the key linkage between the intelligentsia and the presidency was ruptured, thus laying the groundwork for the breakdown of legitimacy that culminated in the 1968 protests and brutal government response.

In an epilogue I reflect on the implications of Díaz Ordaz's retreat from an activist agenda in the context of 1968 and discuss the revitalization of internationalism under his successor, Luis Echeverría (1970–76). By the early 1970s the geopolitical order was again in dramatic flux: US-Soviet détente, the entry of the People's Republic of China (PRC) into the United Nations, an oil embargo by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC), and myriad other factors all pointed not only to the emergence of a multipolar world but a rejuvenated perception among peripheral nations that a new global order could be formed through collective action. Echeverría was determined to insert Mexico within the vanguard of these efforts and did so explicitly by building upon the strategic rationale and institutional legacies inherited from López Mateos. In doing so, moreover, he used a progressive internationalism to rebuild the PRI's internal alliances with the nation's intelligentsia and thus reconstitute a key nexus at the heart of the ruling party's hegemony.

There are multiple possible entry points for researching and writing about the global sixties. This book, using Mexico as a portal, represents one such possibility. It seeks to offer not only a revisionist interpretation of Mexican political culture and international dynamics during a critical moment of the global sixties but also a meaningful contribution to the collective cartographic project that is already well underway.

Notes

Introduction

1 Latin Americanists are just beginning to enter this conversation. See the new collection by Field, Krepp, and Pettinà, *Latin America and the Global Cold War*. For a pathbreaking survey of research beyond Latin America, see the essays in Chen et al., *The Routledge Handbook of the Global Sixties*.

2 Prashad, *Darker Nations*, 45–46.

3 See Pensado and Ochoa, *México beyond 1968*; L. Walker, *Waking from the Dream*. The historiography on the 1968 student movement is vast and continues to grow. In English, relevant works include Draper, *1968 Mexico*; Flaherty, *Hotel Mexico*; Carey, *Plaza of Sacrifices*; Pensado, *Rebel Mexico*; Zolov, *Refried Elvis*.

4 His minister of foreign relations, Manuel Tello Barraud, likewise left no written memoir. But in his various published writings he was forthright about his intentions to steer Mexico toward a broader internationalism under President López Mateos's direction.

5 Krauze, *Mexico*, 658. Krauze devotes only four paragraphs to the internationalism of López Mateos.

6 Ojeda, *Alcances y límites de la política exterior de México*; Garza Elizondo, *Fundamentos y prioridades de la política exterior de México*; Pi-Suñer, Riguzzi, and Ruano, *Historia de las relaciones internacionales de México, 1821–2010*; Torres, *México y el mundo*; Torres, "Estrategias y tácticas mexicanas en la conducción de sus relaciones con Estados Unidos (1945–1970)"; Covarrubias, "La política exterior."

7 The classic study here is Pellicer de Brody, *México y la revolución cubana*. For analyses that are more multifaceted yet adhere to the same fundamental line of interpretation, see Keller, "A Foreign Policy for Domestic Consumption"; Keller, *Mexico's Cold War*; White, *Creating a Third World*; A. Schmidt, "The Political and Economic Reverberations of the Cuban Revolution in Mexico."

8 See Field, Krepp, and Pettinà, *Latin America and the Global Cold War*; Pettinà, "Global Horizons"; Pettinà, "Beyond US Hegemony."

9 The WPC and the MLN have gained the renewed attention of scholars in recent years. See especially Iber, *Neither Peace nor Freedom*, which establishes a global perspective; and Keller, *Mexico's Cold War*, which provides great detail on the MLN though does so within a framework that largely overlooks the global context beyond that of Cuba and the United States. A thorough analysis of the MLN focusing on Mexican internal dynamics is found in Beltrán Villegas, *Un decenio de agitación política*. For earlier discussions of the MLN see Arguedas, "El movimiento de liberación nacional"; Garza, "Factionalism in the Mexican Left"; Maciel, *El movimiento de liberación nacional*; Semo, "El cardenismo"; Servín, "Algunas ramas de un árbol frondoso." An important recent book that discusses the global context of the WPC is Goedde, *The Politics of Peace*.

10 Pensado, *Rebel Mexico*.

11 Camp, *Intellectuals and the State in Twentieth-Century Mexico*, 32.

12 Pellicer de Brody, *México y la revolución cubana*, 51. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.

13 Harmer's succinct encapsulation of the problem first appeared during comments at the conference "Latin America in a Global Context" at the University of Bern in 2014, and the remark has circulated more widely. See also Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War*; Pettinà, "Beyond US Hegemony." Hal Brands's *Latin America's Cold War* similarly seeks to widen the frame of analysis and restore greater agency to Latin American actors though does so largely within the framework of the Soviet-Cuban axis. An important earlier effort to position Mexican foreign policy within a global context is Ojeda, *Alcances y límites de la política exterior de México*. A comprehensive summary analysis is contained in Torres, *México y el mundo*. For new directions in Mexican historiography on the subject, see the recent dossier coordinated by Rodríguez Kuri, "México: Guerra Fría e historia política."

14 Dziedzic, "Mexico and US Grand Strategy," 64. Emphasis in original.

15 Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, xv.

16 The phrase *diffusion of power* was used by President Johnson's national security advisor, Walt Rostow, in 1963. Quoted in Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World*, 136.

17 Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy*, 209.

18 Garrard-Burnett et al., *Beyond the Eagle's Shadow*, for instance, makes no reference to the Good Neighbor; Brands, *Latin America's Cold War*, mentions the Good Neighbor only briefly in the context of the 1930s–1940s; Keller, *Mexico's Cold War*, also makes no reference to the Good Neighbor.

19 Weintraub, *A Marriage of Convenience*. Notably, Weintraub fails to identify the Good Neighbor anywhere in his analysis.

20 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848), in Holden and Zolov, *Latin America and the United States*, 33. Brian Loveman similarly identifies the early use of the phrase *good neighbor* with US relations toward Mexico but erroneously states that its first use was in an address to Congress by President James Buchanan

in 1859, thus overlooking its earlier placement within the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo itself. Loveman, *No Higher Law*, 115.

21 Perhaps most noteworthy was that Mexico, Brazil, and the United States were exclusively celebrated in the OCIAA-subsidized feature-length Walt Disney film *The Three Caballeros* (1944) as "birds of a feather."

22 Meyer Berger, "Aleman Cheered by Million; Confetti Showers Motorcade," *New York Times*, May 3, 1947, 1. It was the first time that a sitting Mexican president had ever set foot on US soil.

23 Mexico contributed manpower (through the bracero labor agreement), strategic minerals (at below market value), intelligence sharing, and ultimately a fighter squadron that participated in the Pacific theater. See M. Paz, *Strategy, Security, and Spies*; Niblo, *War, Diplomacy, and Development*.

24 See Moreno, *Yankee Don't Go Home!*

25 Marwick, *The Sixties*, 8.

26 Westad, *The Global Cold War*.

27 Klimke and Nolan, "Introduction," 1. For a historiographic overview, see Zolov, "Latin America in the Global Sixties," and the essays assembled in the same special issue of *The Americas*. See also Christiansen and Scarlett, *The Third World in the Global 1960s*. For a focus on culture, see Chaplin and Mooney, *The Global 1960s*; Brown and Lison, *The Global Sixties in Sound and Vision*. A foundational effort to integrate geopolitics and sociocultural upheaval within this similar time frame is Suri, *Power and Protest*.

28 Mills, "Letter to the New Left," 8.

29 Thompson, "Socialist Humanism," 109.

30 Gosse, *Rethinking the New Left*, 5. For discussion of this debate in the Latin American context, see Iber, *Neither Peace nor Freedom*; Gilman, *Entre la pluma y el fusil*; Franco, *The Decline and Fall of the Lettered City*.

31 Servín, *Ruptura y oposición*, 267.

32 Servín, *Ruptura y oposición*, 294.

33 Monsiváis, *Autobiografía*, 21.

34 Carr, *Marxism and Communism*, 199.

35 Carr, *Marxism and Communism*, 197–201; Spenser, *En combate*; Zolov, "Expanding our Conceptual Horizons." Lombardo Toledano was central to the creation of the official CTM labor movement during the Cárdenas era and led the CTM until he was marginalized from power during the conservative reorientation of the PRI. In addition to launching the Partido Popular in 1949, he helped found and became leader of the left-wing continental trade movement, the Confederación de los Trabajadores de América Latina (CTAL, Confederation of Latin American Workers). Both platforms were used by Lombardo Toledano to project himself as the person best positioned to recapture the socialist mandate formerly advocated by the PRI under Cárdenas.

36 Carr, "The Fate of the Vanguard under a Revolutionary State"; Spenser, *En combate*.

37 Quoted in Buchenau, "Por una Guerra Fría mas templada," 129.

38 Buchenau, "Por una Guerra Fría mas templada," 134.

39 Editorial, *Problemas de Latinoamérica* 1, no. 2 (July 16, 1954): 27; C. Cárdenas, *Sobre mis pasos*, 23–32.

40 See Iber, *Neither Peace nor Freedom*, chap. 5. At that stage, Cárdenas was not formally part of the WPC though other prominent Mexican leftists were, including Lombardo Toledano and Heriberto Jara (who in 1950 had received one of the first Stalin Peace Prizes awarded). The conferring of the prize was clearly used to align Cárdenas with the Soviet-front organization.

41 Arias Bernal, "Tardío," *Excélsior*, February 27, 1956, 7A. The Soviet Twentieth Congress was held on February 14–26, 1956. Some of the language from this paragraph borrows from Zolov, "Expanding our Conceptual Horizons."

42 Manuel Becerra Acosta Jr., "'No hay país que no busque la paz,' declara Cárdenas," *Excélsior*, February 27, 1956, 1A.

43 Acosta, "'No hay país que no busque la paz,' declara Cárdenas."

44 Buchenau, "Por una Guerra fría más templada," 132–33; Servín, "Propaganda y Guerra Fría"; Gillingham and Smith, *Dictablanda*; Gillingham, Lettieri and Smith, *Journalism, Satire and Censorship in Mexico*. On "presidentialism," see Mraz, "Today, Tomorrow, and Always"; Zolov, "The Graphic Satire of Mexico's Jorge Carreño and the Politics of Presidentialism during the 1960s."

45 Aguayo Quezada, *La charola*, 71. See also Padilla and Walker, "Dossier: Spy Reports"; Keller, *Mexico's Cold War*, 24–25; Raat, "US Intelligence Operations and Covert Action in Mexico, 1900–1947." In the archives, DIPS is also written as DGIPS but for consistency the term *DIPS* will be used throughout the manuscript when citing this material.

46 William Hudson to Department of State, January 10, 1955, Record Group (hereafter RG) 59, 712.00/1–1055, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NARA).

47 Carr, *Marxism and Communism*, 190.

48 "Mexico: Annual Review for 1957," February 10, 1958, Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 371/132209, National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom (hereafter TNA).

49 Sir Andrew Noble (UK Embassy) to FO, October 4, 1960, FO 371/48385, TNA.

Chapter One: Mexico's "Restless" Left and the Resurrection of Lázaro Cárdenas

1 Robert Hill to John Foster Dulles, cable, July 4, 1958, RG 59, Library Microfilm (hereafter LM) 116, reel 1, NARA; Ruth Mason Hughes to Department of State, cable, July 7, 1958, 712.00/7-758, NARA. Hughes's cable also describes "elaborate precautions" taken to safeguard the elections, including "fully equipped riot squads" stationed in various parts of the capital.

2 "Mexico: Annual Review for 1957," February 10, 1958, FO 371/132209, TNA. The literature on the Mexican Revolution and political system is expansive, both in Spanish and in English. A foundational work on the Mexican Revolution is Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*. An important scholarly assessment of the evolution and functioning of the political system after the revolution is Gillingham and Smith, *Dictablanda*. An accessible narrative approach is Krauze, *Mexico*.