

# **Eran Shmaya. Updated: August 31, 2023**

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## **Education**

- B.Sc., School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, 1995.
- M.Sc., School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, 2003. Advisor: Eilon Solan
- Ph.D., School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, 2007. Advisor: Ehud Lehrer

## **Academic Appointments**

- Assistant Professor, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University (2009-2020)
- Associate Professor, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University (2015-2020)
- Senior Lecturer, Department of Statistics and Operations Research, School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University (2013-15)
- Professor, Stony Brook University (2021-)

## **Current editorial positions**

Mathematics of Operations Research, Associate Editor.  
Econometrica, Associate Editor.

## **Past editorial positions**

International Journal of Game Theory, Associate Editor.  
Mathematics of Social Sciences, Associate Editor.  
Journal of Dynamics and Games, Associate Editor.

## Working papers

- Noga Alon, Benjamin Gunby, Xiaoyu He, Eran Shmaya, and Eilon Solan. Identifying the deviator. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2203.03744*, 2022, R&R at Annals of Applied Probability
- Yingni Guo and Eran Shmaya. Robust monopoly regulation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.04260*, 2019, R&R at *American Economic Review*
- Yingni Guo and Eran Shmaya. Regret-minimizing project choice. Technical report, 2022, accepted to *Econometrica*

## Publications

- Yingni Guo and Eran Shmaya. Costly miscalibration. *Theoretical Economics*, 16(2):477–506, 2021
- Yingni Guo and Eran Shmaya. The interval structure of optimal disclosure. *Econometrica*, 87(2):653–675, 2019
- Nabil I Al-Najjar and Eran Shmaya. Recursive utility and parameter uncertainty. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 181:274–288, 2019
- Tai-Wei Hu and Eran Shmaya. Unique monetary equilibrium with inflation in a stationary bewley–aiyagari model. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 180:368–382, 2019
- Ehud Kalai and Eran Shmaya. Large strategic dynamic interactions. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 178:59–81, 2018
- Nabil I Al-Najjar and Eran Shmaya. Learning the fundamentals in a stationary environment. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 109:616–624, 2018
- Christopher P Chambers, Federico Echenique, and Eran Shmaya. General revealed preference theory. *Theoretical Economics*, 12(2):493–511, 2017
- Eran Shmaya and Leeat Yariv. Experiments on decisions under uncertainty: A theoretical framework. *American Economic Review*, 106(7):1775–1801, 2016
- Yi-Chun Chen, Ehud Lehrer, Jiangtao Li, Dov Samet, and Eran Shmaya. Agreeing to agree and dutch books. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 93:108–116, 2015

- Ronen Gradwohl and Eran Shmaya. Tractable falsifiability. *Economics & Philosophy*, 31(2):259–274, 2015
- Nabil I Al-Najjar and Eran Shmaya. Uncertainty and disagreement in equilibrium models. *Journal of Political Economy*, 123(4):778–808, 2015
- Yaron Azrieli and Eran Shmaya. Rental harmony with roommates. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 153:128–137, 2014
- János Flesch, Jeroen Kuipers, Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, Gijs Schoenmakers, Eran Shmaya, Eilon Solan, and Koos Vrieze. Non-existence of subgame-perfect  $\epsilon$ -equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon. *International Journal of Game Theory*, 43(4):945–951, 2014
- Christopher P Chambers, Federico Echenique, and Eran Shmaya. The axiomatic structure of empirical content. *American Economic Review*, 104(8):2303–19, 2014
- Alvaro Sandroni and Eran Shmaya. A prequential test for exchangeable theories. *Journal of Dynamics and Games*, 1:497–505, 2014
- Ehud Lehrer, Dinah Rosenberg, and Eran Shmaya. Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 81:179–191, 2013
- Alvaro Sandroni and Eran Shmaya. Eliciting beliefs by paying in chance. *Economic Theory Bulletin*, 1(1):33–37, 2013
- Yaron Azrieli and Eran Shmaya. Lipschitz games. *Mathematics of Operations Research*, 38(2):350–357, 2013
- Tai Wei Hu and Eran Shmaya. Expressible inspections. *Theoretical Economics*, 8(2):263–280, 2013
- Eran Shmaya. The determinacy of infinite games with eventual perfect monitoring. *Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society*, 139(10):3665–3678, 2011
- Christopher P Chambers, Federico Echenique, and Eran Shmaya. Testable implications of gross substitutes in demand for two goods. *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, 3(1):129–36, 2011

- Christopher P Chambers, Federico Echenique, and Eran Shmaya. On behavioral complementarity and its implications. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 145(6):2332–2355, 2010
- Ehud Lehrer, Dinah Rosenberg, and Eran Shmaya. Signaling and mediation in games with common interests. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 68(2):670–682, 2010
- Eran Shmaya. Many inspections are manipulable. *Theoretical Economics*, 3(3):367–382, 2008
- Ehud Lehrer and Eran Shmaya. Two remarks on blackwell’s theorem. *Journal of Applied Probability*, 45(2):580–586, 2008
- Ehud Lehrer and Eran Shmaya. A qualitative approach to quantum probability. *Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences*, 462(2072):2331–2344, 2006
- Eran Shmaya. Nonbilocal measurement via an entangled state. *Physical Review A*, 72(2):022315, 2005
- Eran Shmaya. The value of information structures in zero-sum games with lack of information on one side. *International Journal of Game Theory*, 34(2):155–165, 2006
- Eran Shmaya. Comparison of information structures and completely positive maps. *Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and General*, 38(44):9717, 2005
- Eran Shmaya and Eilon Solan. Zero-sum dynamic games and a stochastic variation of ramsey’s theorem. *Stochastic processes and their applications*, 112(2):319–329, 2004
- Eran Shmaya, Eilon Solan, et al. Two-player nonzero-sum stopping games in discrete time. *The annals of probability*, 32(3B):2733–2764, 2004
- Eran Shmaya, Eilon Solan, and Nicolas Vieille. An application of ramsey theorem to stopping games. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 42(2):300–306, 2003